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Abstract
This paper uses a survey of 3,300 firms in 25 transition countries to
shed light on the factors that influence restructuring by firms and their
subsequent performance as measured by growth in sales and in sales
per employee over a three-year period. We begin by surveying what a
decade of transition has taught us about the factors that determine how
firms respond to the new market environment. We go on to analyse the
impact on performance of ownership, soft budget constraints, the
general business environment and a range of measures of the intensity
of competition as perceived by a firm. We find that competition has an
important and non-monotonic effect on the growth of sales and of
labour productivity: some degree of perceived market power is
associated with higher sales growth, but competitive pressure is also
important. Similar competition effects are found upon firms’ decisions
to develop and improve their products, but market power has an
unambiguously negative impact on purely defensive (cost-reducing)
restructuring activity. New firms have grown relatively fast, but among
old firms ownership per se has no significant relationship to
performance (though state-owned firms have engaged in significantly
less development of new products). Soft budget constraints have a
broadly negative and the business environment a broadly positive
impact on restructuring and performance.
Keywords: competition, restructuring, privatization, soft budget
constraints, business environment
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What determines the success with which firms in transition economies can
respond to the demands of the new market environment? And where can the most
important gains in productivity be expected to come from? In this paper we report the
results of a large cross-country survey of firms from 25 countries that show the
relative influence of competition, ownership and features of firms’ external
environment (including the presence of soft budget constraints) on their restructuring
actions and subsequent sales and productivity performance. These results show
convincingly that competition matters, but it matters in an intriguing and complex
way.
When the process of transition began there was widespread agreement that
liberalization - the power of firms to set prices, choose what to produce and invest as
they thought fit - was a necessary condition for significant improvement in the
productivity of the economy as a whole. But beyond that there was little consensus as
to the nature of the industrial transformation to be expected.
Findings such as those of Hare & Hughes (1991) led some observers to expect
that the main gains from reform would come from a re-direction of resources between
sectors of the economy, from those where value-added was low (or even negative) to
those where value added was high. Others thought the main gains would come from
changes in corporate governance, specifically from the privatization of hitherto state-
owned enterprises and from the elimination of state subsidies. Yet others thought that
the essential ingredient was competition, which could not be ensured merely by
privatization since many state-owned enterprises were effectively monopolists (e.g.,
Newbery & Kattuman, 1992). What else was required to ensure competition was also
much disputed: many countries set up competition agencies to try to establish
competitive conditions directly (e.g., Fingleton et.al., 1996), while skeptics argued
that the only important consideration was trade liberalization so as to import
competition from abroad (e.g., Sachs & Berg, 1992; the discussion is reviewed in
Neven & Seabright, 1998). Entry by new firms was viewed as an important
component of the economic transformation but there was great uncertainty about its
likely quantitative contribution to improved performance (e.g., Johnson, 1994).
More recently attention has been drawn to the importance of the overall
environment for market transactions, which may affect all firms in an economy
though not necessarily in a uniform way (e.g., Brunetti et al.,1997a, Hellman et al.,
2000, Hellman & Schankerman, 2000). This environment comprises a range of factors
associated with the functioning of the state that influence the profitability and
predictability of economic activity – from tax systems to regulatory hurdles, to
official corruption, to organized criminality and the uncertain enforcement of business
contracts and property rights. Without a sound business environment, it is argued,
new investment and improved productivity are unlikely to emerge from abandoning
central planning, liberalizing prices and trade, changing ownership and cutting state
support.
What have ten years of transition taught us about the relative importance of
these different factors? This paper uses the results of a large survey of firms across
transition countries to investigate this issue. We begin in section 1 by reviewing
briefly a number of existing findings under the headings of sectoral reallocation,
corporate governance, soft budget constraints, business environment and competition.
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In the remainder of the paper, we use the results of a survey of 3,300 firms to pursue
the question of the determinants of performance improvements in the business sector
in transition. The survey was undertaken by the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development and the World Bank.2 In section 2, the survey sample is outlined.
This is followed by a preliminary description of the data according to the
determinants of performance discussed in section 1. Section 3 outlines the
econometric problems raised by the data available and the modelling strategy used in
the paper. Section 4 presents the results for the analysis of both restructuring and
performance improvements. Section 5 summarizes our findings and concludes.
1 Determinants of performance improvement in the business sector of
transition economies
A striking and poorly anticipated feature of the transition has been the extent
of deterioration of performance as measured by the decline in output. Using the broad
measure of real GDP, the weighted average for the countries in Central and Eastern
Europe and the Baltics showed a U-shaped pattern with a deterioration of about 20%
compared with the 1990 level until 1992-3 followed by recovery (for example,
Chart 3.1, EBRD, 1999). The level of GDP was still 5% below the 1990 level in 1999.
For the CIS, the pattern is more L-shaped. The cumulative fall in GDP was more than
40% of the 1990 level. The level of output remained fairly flat from about 1995. This
provides the macro context for the analysis of “performance improvement” at the
level of the firm, which is the focus of this paper.
In this section, we assess factors identified in the literature as likely to
contribute to the improvement of performance. We consider in turn the inter-sectoral
reallocation of resources, ownership change, hardening of budget constraints, the
improvement of the “business environment” and competition.
First, aggregate productivity gains have not primarily come from inter-sectoral
shifts. As Appendix 1 shows, it is possible to decompose changes in aggregate labour
productivity exactly into within-sector and between-sector components. The
contribution of the between-sector component will obviously be greater the more
narrowly the sectors are defined. In market economies the contribution of resource
shifts between 2-digit SIC sectors to aggregate productivity change is typically small.
Fig. 1(a) illustrates for the case of Austria,3 where between-sector movements
accounted for 6.5% of the total between 1991 and 1996 (1.1 percentage points out of a
total increase of 17.4 percentage points). It was natural to expect that the contribution
would be larger in transition economies, but in fact this was not so. Fig. 1(b) shows
that for Poland,4 a country that saw continuous and rapid increases in average labour
                                                                
2 Preliminary findings from this survey were reported in the 1999 Transition Report of the EBRD.
3 Austria is entirely typical. In France, for example, between-sector movements accounted for 8.9% of
total productivity change between 1990 and 1996 (1.25 percentage points out of a total increase of 14
percentage points). In the United States between 1987 and 1996, the between-sector component was
even slightly negative, indicating a slight shift of labour towards lower-productivity activities.
4 Poland is in turn entirely typical of transition economies that saw increases in productivity. In the
Czech Republic the contribution of between-sector components was 4.3% of the total (2.4 percentage
points out of an increase of 55.4 percentage points). In Hungary it was less than a tenth of a percentage
point out of a total increase of 52.3 percentage points. However, preliminary calculations suggest that
circumstances were different in countries where aggregate labour productivity fell. In Russia, aggregate
4
productivity between 1992 and 1996, the contribution of between-sector components
was a mere 4.2% of the total (1.9 percentage points out of a total increase of 45.2
percentage points).
[Fig. 1 here]
Second, a striking finding has been the absence of clear and unambiguous
effect of changes in ownership or corporate governance on the performance of the
affected firms. Apart from a general consensus that state ownership had failed, there
was little initial agreement among either politicians or their expert advisers as to the
appropriate nature or speed of privatization. Consequently the transition economies
have seen a bewildering variety of types of scheme – from voucher privatization to
initial public offerings, from insider to outsider schemes. The transformation from
predominantly state-owned to predominantly privately-owned firms has varied from
astonishingly fast to stubbornly slow. It would be natural to expect this variety of
experiences to constitute a great natural experiment, yielding powerful evidence about
what works and what does not. But so far, at least, that has not happened.5 Evidence
that privatization enhances performance has not leapt out of the data. It has had to be
coaxed out by careful adjustments that allow for the fact that the choice of firms for
privatization may have been far from random and that the effect of ownership change
may be different for different performance measures.6  Evidence that the form of
privatization matters has been even more elusive.7
A recent attempt has been made to use the statistical technique of meta-
analysis to synthesize the empirical results of over one hundred studies (Djankov and
Murrell, 2000). Meta-analysis aims to provide an objective quantitative combination
of all studies that have investigated a common question. The advantage as compared
with the “narrative” or “historical” approach to the review of the literature is that
individual studies may be inconclusive because they lack statistical power and
reviews are prone to reporter bias in the selection of studies. Meta-analysis provides a
pooled estimate based on the estimates in the individual studies. The key problems
with using meta-analysis are the heterogeneity in the sample selection and in the
models tested in the individual studies (privatization “treatments”, types of firms,
dependent variable, study design and statistical analysis). Meta-analysis is least
problematic in the case of randomized trials (e.g., in medical research).8 The Djankov
                                                                                                                                                                                         
labour productivity was 3.4% lower in 1998 than in 1992, but without the between-sector component it
would have been 23.4% lower. In Romania, productivity was 3.8% lower in 1996 than in 1991, and
without the between-sector component it would have been 12.2% lower. In the case of these two
countries the between-sector component appears to be reflecting differential rates of labour shedding
rather than the movement of labour from one sector to another. However, unresolved questions remain
about the comparability of the price indices used to calculate these results.
5 See Carlin (2000).
6 See Claessens and Djankov (1999a), Grosfeld and Nivet (1997), Smith et al. (1997) and Frydman et
al. (1999).
7 A study of firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (Frydman et al. 1999) finds that both
manager and employee-ownership is associated with performance no better than that of state-owned
firms whereas studies of Russia (Earle and Estrin 1997), of Estonia (Jones and Mygind 1999) and of
Slovenia (Smith et al. 1997) find results to the contrary for manager-owned, worker-owned or both. A
study of six CIS countries finds that where managers have a stake of more than 30% or less than 10%,
the effect is positive (Djankov 1999b).
8 For a survey of the methodological problems associated with “narrative” and meta-analysis reviews,
see Chalmers and Altman (1995).
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and Murrell paper attempts to take such factors into account by scoring individual
studies according to the nature and quality of the methodologies adopted. But they fail
to address the problem that there may exist a bias that is consistent in its effect across
studies.  For example, if “on average” across countries and studies, better firms are
selected for privatization, then averaging across studies averages the bias, and scoring
as they do simply weights the bias differently but does not eliminate it.
With these important caveats in mind about the suitability of meta-analysis to
analyze the determinants of performance in the transition, the findings of Djankov and
Murrell are reported. Pooling 35 studies, they found that privatization improved
performance significantly. For the CIS countries, however, there was no significant
difference between the performance of state-owned and privatized firms. From 23
studies that looked at the effectiveness of different kinds of owners, it appears that
correction for selection bias alters the ranking of performance improvements. Taking
selection bias into account, investment funds, blockholders, foreigners and
commercialized state-owned firms performed better than traditional state-owned
enterprises (SOEs); manager-owned firms performed no differently from SOEs.
However, enterprise level studies may miss one of the main ways in which
privatization matters. Such studies either compare the average performance of
different countries (and so are complicated by all the many differences in initial
conditions and in country experiences that are going on at the same time) or else
compare the experience of different firms within the same country. There may be
powerful influences across firms that confuse the comparison between them. There
are two particular reasons for thinking this. The first is that commitment to a
privatization process may have a dramatic effect on the incentives for managers of all
firms in a country, not just those that have already been privatized but also those who
see the prospect of privatization looming in the near future.9 The second is that
transition economies have been characterized by even stronger inter-dependencies
between firms and their customers and suppliers than is true of market economies.
Blanchard & Kremer (1997) make this the centerpiece of their explanation for the
aggregate fall in output of many countries in the transition process. The consequence
is that the performance of a privatized firm may be strongly influenced by that of its
non-privatized customers and suppliers, and conversely for state-owned firms.
Third, there is abundant evidence (Schaffer, 1998) that poor performance by
firms leads them to be bailed out by the state. In Djankov and Murrell’s meta-
analysis, they pool the results of 10 studies and report a link between soft budget
constraints and weaker firm performance. This is insignificant for CIS countries
alone. State owned firms and larger firms are characterized by softer budget
constraints. One of the studies is Frydman et al. (2000) in which it is argued that it
was the inability of state firms to generate revenue growth that necessitated budgetary
softness if the enterprises were not to fail. In other words, in their view, privatization
is a necessary condition if hard budget constraints are to improve the revenue
performance of firms that are currently state-owned. A major problem that all studies
of this type face is how to identify the chain of causality between performance and
budgetary softness. By definition, firms with soft budget constraints are rescued
                                                                
9 Pinto et.al. (1993) was one of the earliest studies to draw attention to the fact that hardening of budget
constraints might have a stronger effect on behaviour than privatization itself, even if the former was
only possible in an environment characterized by a commitment to eventual privatization.
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because they are performing poorly; but does the existence of soft budget constraints
ex ante cause firms to perform poorly in the first place? It is difficult to solve this
endogeneity problem through the use of instrumental variables estimation because of
a lack of suitable instruments. The use of meta-analysis cannot help here; this is a case
where the direction of the bias is very likely to be consistent across studies. We return
to this issue below.
Fourth, there is a growing body of evidence that the business environment, as
shaped by how the state functions, has a significant impact on aggregate economic
performance. Analyses of the world-wide business environment implemented by the
World Bank in 1996, for example, reveal significant relationships between the quality
of the business environment and both aggregate growth and investment. Brunetti et al.
(1997) find in cross-country regressions a significant and positive relationship
between businesses’ perceptions of the credibility of government policy and both
growth in GDP per capita and the share of fixed investment in GDP, after controlling
for other factors. Fries and Gelfer (2000) show that “reward-to-volatility” ratios for
stock market returns (1996-99) of the countries covered in the 1996 World Bank
survey are significantly and positively related to key dimensions of the soundness of
the business environment, including the predictability of government policies,
corruption and access to finance. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that
the quality of the business environment is significantly related to the risks and
expected returns to investment. The analysis in this paper is a first attempt to identify
the impact of the business environment in transition economies on individual
enterprises, both in terms of their growth and restructuring decisions.
Finally, studies are beginning to accumulate that examine the role of
competition in the transition. 10 Nickell motivates his 1996 paper by noting the paucity
of evidence for market economies of a causal link from competition to improved
performance. He observes that the most convincing evidence comes from a “broad
brush” comparison between the lack of dynamism of centrally planned as compared
with market economies (Nickell, 1996).
Identifying the role of competition is not easy. The degree of competition
faced by a firm is not particularly easy to measure since competition might affect
performance through a variety of quite different means and changes in performance
would be expected in turn to affect market structure. For instance, even if the degree
of competition it faces has no direct causal influence on the behaviour of any
individual firm, it may be that more competitive market environments see a faster
                                                                
10 In a study of Bulgaria, Jones et al. (1998) found a positive effect of larger market share on
performance.  Using a measure of competition at industry level, Konings (1998) found in a study of
Bulgaria and Estonia that more competitive pressure in the industry enhanced firm performance in
Bulgaria but not in Estonia. For Russia, Earle and Estrin (1998) found that greater competition in the
market complemented the effect of privatization in enhancing performance.  Brown and Earle (2000)
reported strong positive effects of domestic and import competition in the product market on total
factor productivity. A study of Georgian firms (Djankov and Kreacic 1998) found that competition
from foreign producers tended to be associated with employment cuts and changes in suppliers (but
tended to reduce the likelihood of the disposal of assets, renovations and computerization). By contrast,
firms with a larger market share were more likely to engage in computerization, renovations, the
establishment of a new marketing department and the disposal of assets. Djankov and Murrell (2000)
pool 17 studies and report a positive impact of competition on performance. Whereas for the non-CIS,
both domestic and foreign competition are effective, for the CIS countries, only domestic competition
is significant.
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replacement of relatively inefficient by relatively efficient firms. In this case, a
correlation emerges over time between a measure of competition at industry level and
the average efficiency of those firms that survive.
In fact it is quite likely that competition has a direct influence on behaviour,
but economic models show that the effect may be ambiguous. One example of
ambiguity comes from Willig’s (1987) model, in which he demonstrates two
offsetting effects of increased competition on the incentives for managers to exert
effort. Whilst increased competition makes profits more sensitive to managerial effort,
it also depresses demand for the firm’s output, which dampens profits and hence
blunts the incentive.
In the innovation literature, there are models that suggest that more
competition is good for innovation and others that highlight a hump-shaped
relationship, in which a moderate degree of competition is better than either
monopoly or intense competition. For reasons first suggested by Schumpeter and
recently analyzed more formally by others (see Aghion & Howitt, 1998, for example),
some degree of prior market power may be important in providing firms with
sufficient retained earnings to finance investment. Moreover, the prospect of some
future profits may be essential to ensure that current retained earnings are indeed
invested instead of wasted. Other variants stress a monotonic relationship with greater
competition inducing productivity growth. For example, the emergence of new
competitors threatens the temporary monopoly profits from innovation and increases
the incentive of the incumbents to shorten the innovation cycle (Aghion, Dewatripont
and Rey 1997).
Empirical support for the role of competition as a spur to innovation comes
from recent econometric research using the number of innovations as the measure of
performance (e.g., Blundell et al. 1995). This is consistent with the results of a quite
different methodology (bench-marking using case studies) in which Baily and
Gersbach (1995) found that “head-to-head” competition in the same market resulted
in faster innovation in several manufacturing industries. Nickell (1996) controls for
industry level concentration and import concentration and tests whether a firm-level
measure of competition is correlated with performance. He finds that indicators of
competitive pressure at firm level are significantly related to the level and growth of
total factor productivity. In an empirical study of entry thresholds, Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991) found that most of the competitive impact from entry comes from the
first two entrants to challenge a monopolist, with the effect levelling out once market
participants number around five.
Although competition is not straightforward to measure there are reasons for
thinking that the economic environment in transition economies provides a more
fruitful setting in which to test hypotheses about the effects of competition than
equivalent environments in market economies. This is because of the well-known
problem that market structure changes over time in response to competitive pressures,
and therefore that the causality may run from performance to structure as much as the
other way around. Transition economies differ from market economies in that much
of their market structure as inherited from central planning had not been shaped at all
by market forces, so the variety of observed market structure may provide a more
genuine natural experiment than we normally see.
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2 The nature of the survey and preliminary data description
The EBRD and the World Bank conducted a large survey of enterprises in
twenty transition countries in the early summer of 1999 and its provisional findings
were published in the EBRD Transition Report 1999. Surveys of five more transition
countries were completed later in 1999. The aim of the survey was to investigate how
enterprise restructuring behaviour and performance were related to competitive
pressure, the quality of the business environment, and the relationship between
enterprises and the state. The survey was a cross-section and, as will be clear in
section 3, cannot therefore answer some of the questions more appropriate to panel
data. However, its size and broad scope are unusually valuable, as is the fact that it
poses detailed questions about the firms’ business and competitive environment, and
about the different restructuring actions taken by them in the recent past.
The full sample size was 3,954 firms. The survey included approximately 125
firms from each of the 25 countries, with larger samples in Poland and Ukraine (over
200 firms) and in Russia (over 500 firms). Sampling was random from the population
of firms in each country, except that minimum quotas were imposed for state-owned
firms and large firms. Initial analysis of the data suggested that developments in the
agricultural sector were quite different from those in the non-agricultural business
sector. We therefore omit from the analysis 453 firms in agriculture as well as firms
missing any of the most basic indicators (industry, size classification, ownership
classification, sales growth and employment growth) leaving us with a sample of
3,305 firms.  The figures reported in the tables below sometimes rely on a smaller
sample because of missing values in an indicator of interest; the econometric analysis
in the next section removes all firms with missing values in any variable in use,
reducing the sample to 2,245 firms.
Just over half the firms in the sample were newly-established private firms,
8% were privatized to insiders (managers and/or employees), 22% were privatized to
outsiders, and 16% remained state-owned. Table 1 provides some basic information
on the distribution by size, sector and region of the sample of firms. The sample is
dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises; just over half the sampled firms
employed fewer than 50 persons, and less than 8% employed more than 500. The
firms are divided fairly evenly between industry (46%) and services (54%); just over
one-third of firms are from the manufacturing sector. About one-third of the sample is
from the Central and Eastern European region (including the Baltics) and 12% of
firms are Russian. Most firms were located in either large cities or national capitals
(41%) or in medium-sized cities (34%), with the remaining one-quarter in towns and
rural areas. 11
 [Table 1 here]
                                                                
11 For the allocation of countries to regions, see Table 7.
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Performance, Restructuring and Management Turnover
Table 2 presents data on the average performance by firms using the
performance measures that we concentrate on in this paper: the growth of real sales
and of real sales per worker. These measures were calculated from self-reported
figures for the real growth of sales and of employment over the previous three years.
In the sample as a whole, 30% of firms reported a contraction in sales (in real
terms) over the previous three years; just under one-quarter reported flat sales and just
over 46% reported growing sales. The Central and Eastern European region including
the Baltic States (CEB) and the South East European region (SEE) were the only
regions in which more than one half of firms reported growing sales. In line with the
macroeconomic performance across different regions, the proportion of firms with
shrinking sales in a region ranged from just over one-fifth in CEB to one-third in
Russia and 40% in the Western and Southern CIS.
For state-owned and privatized firms, average growth of sales was negative; it
was positive for new firms. The opposite was true of productivity growth: average
growth of sales per worker was negative in new firms and positive in old ones. For
both privatized and new private firms, average growth increased with the size of the
firm. This was not the case for state firms. In old firms, where between 55 and 60% of
firms had declining sales, the more rapid shedding of labour than reduction of output
lies behind the positive productivity growth recorded. In new firms, average
productivity growth was negative but there is a clear size effect: as we move to higher
size classes, productivity growth becomes less negative. In the largest size class,
positive productivity growth was recorded for new firms.  A possible explanation for
this size effect is the endogeneity of size. Larger firms may be larger at the time of
survey because they grew faster (or shrank less rapidly); we return to this issue in the
next section when we discuss our econometric estimations.
[Table 2 here]
The survey instrument was designed to explore in some detail the extent to
which firms had engaged in restructuring actions. These activities include “defensive
restructuring” that can take the form labour shedding and plant closures and “strategic
restructuring” or innovation, which in the context of transition economies refers to the
introduction of new products to the market or the upgrading of existing ones.
Managers were also questioned about the firm’s relationships with suppliers,
customers and banks and about changes in the firm’s organizational structure.
These questions about restructuring are important since they enable us to
explore more closely how performance improvements come about. Images of “good”
hard-working firms pitted against “bad” unchanging dinosaurs may be quite
inaccurate as an account of the forces shaping economic change. As will be seen,
successful firms differ from unsuccessful ones much less in whether they attempt to
restructure than in the kinds of restructuring they undertake.
Table 3 indicates the various types of action that firms have been taking. Early
studies of transition frequently found that amongst old firms, there was little
difference in the defensive restructuring actions taken by privatized and state-owned
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firms. In the wake of the marketization shock, it was expected that both privatized and
state-owned firms would be forced to cut costs by reducing employment and closing
unviable plants. Private ownership was thought to be more relevant for strategic
restructuring with the implication that privatized and new private firms would tend to
dominate the expansion of employment and the introduction of new products.
We begin with defensive restructuring. As we would expect, old firms were
much more likely to cut employment than new entrants and the difference between
state and privatized firms were small. Plant closures show a very similar pattern.
New entrants, by contrast, were much more likely to create jobs. As expected,
privatized firms created more employment than state owned firms and were more
likely to open a new plant. Interestingly, one-fifth of new firms had opened a new
plant in the previous three years. The table also provides information on specific
forms of strategic restructuring. There is some support in the table for the idea that
private firms (both privatized and new ones) have engaged in more new product
development than state firms. There is little difference between state and privatized
firms in their record on upgrading of existing products. Amongst old firms, those
privatized are somewhat more likely than state ones to have changed suppliers and
customer base in the previous three years, and to have initiated significant changes in
their organizational structure. Although new firms appear about as likely to have
changed their suppliers as privatized firms, they were much less likely to have
engaged in organizational change.
There are also noticeable size effects. Large firms were more likely to have
decreased employment than were smaller ones; they were also more likely to have
closed or opened plants. The introduction of new products and the upgrading of
existing ones is also positively related to the size of the firm.
[Table 3 here]
Managers are the agents of restructuring and the survey allows us to identify
the extent to which there were changes in management. Table 4 shows details of
management change. Old firms changed management more often than new entrants
(which is understandable given the small size of many new entrants and the likelihood
that a high proportion of them were owner-managed). Interestingly, managerial
turnover was higher in state than in privatized firms, and state-owned firms were just
as likely as those privatized to outsiders (and much more likely than insider-privatized
firms) to have made use of the managerial labour market to bring in new blood from
outside.
[Table 4 here]
Overall, the differences between privatized and state firms are perhaps less
marked than the fact that both types of firm have clearly been very active in recent
years. As we have seen, many of the indicators of restructuring are positively related
to size: it is not just small and medium enterprises that have demonstrated flexibility
and readiness to change. Even if state firms have shown somewhat less willingness to
restructure than private firms, they are far from being unchanging dinosaurs.
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But to the extent that state, privatized and new private firms do behave
differently, why does this happen? Is it because of intrinsic differences in incentives
due to ownership, or to the fact that ownership is correlated with other things, such as
a difference in the intensity of competition or a different relationship to the state? To
pursue this question further, it is necessary to examine the external environment and
constraints on firms.
External Environment and Constraints
The survey collected information on the external environment as perceived by
the firm. In particular, we have indicators of the firm’s
• relationship with the state as measured by tax arrears, arrears to utilities and
receipt of direct subsidies;
• perception of the quality of the general business environment in the country;
• perception of the nature of competition it faces in the market.
We consider two ways to measure the country-level factors that determine the
overall environment for business activity, and which may be important determinants
of performance. The first is an indicator of the presence of soft budget constraints. In
principle, a soft budget constraint is a feature of the environment faced by a particular
firm, namely the likelihood that it would receive a subsidy or could run up arrears on
its debts if it wished. In practice, however, all we can observe are a firm’s estimates of
its problems with tax arrears to central and local government and arrears to utilities.
These measures are frequently used in studies as indicators of the presence of a soft
budget in a country (Schaffer 1998), but they do not allow us to identify soft budget
constraints on a firm-by-firm basis, still less to test for their association with
performance. Are firms without arrears or subsidies firms that are performing well
and so do not need the arrears or subsidies to which they in principle have access? Or
are they firms that have come to terms with hard budget constraints and so perform
better than they would otherwise do? We discuss in the next section how we deal with
this problem in our econometric work.  Here we report the variation across countries
and across ownership type and size class in reported budget softness.
We construct our soft budget constraint index using the method of principal
components, using the same set of 2,245 firms used for the econometric analysis.  The
raw measures of soft budgets are the ratings by firms of arrears to central government,
local government, and utilities, all on a scale of 1 (“substantial”) to 4 (none owed).
Our soft budget constraint index is the first principal component extracted from
unstandardized responses; it is a weighted average of the raw measures, where the
weights are the eigenvectors of the first component.  The results of the principal
components analysis are presented in Table 5.  The first principal component explains
82% of the variance in the three raw measures; the weights given to the three raw
measures in the construction of the index are fairly close, with the heaviest weight
given to arrears to central government.  We normalize the constructed index to lie in
the interval [0,1], where 1 indicates a high degree of budget softness and would be the
score of a firm that had rated all three categories of arrears as “substantial”.
The second measure is one that represents the overall business environment.
The survey asked managers to rank the extent to which aspects of the macroeconomy,
taxation, policy stability, business regulation, the operation of the judiciary, law and
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order, infrastructure and finance imposed obstacles on the operation and growth of
their business. These are evidently subjective reports and as such are subject to well-
known biases (notably that a tendency to complain may be either a luxury of a
relatively favourable situation, or an excuse to use when the firm is doing badly).
Nevertheless, in the hope that they may cast a little light on a notoriously murky area,
we have employed a similar procedure to the soft budget constraint variable and
constructed a measure of the overall business environment in each country based on
principal components analysis; the results are presented in Table 6.  The first of the 11
components explains 34% of the total variance, much more than the remaining 10 –
the second component explains only 13%.  The heaviest weights in the index are
given to crime, corruption, the exchange rate, policy instability, and inflation.  We
again normalize the index to lie in the interval [0,1], where 1 indicates a “good”
business environment and would be the score of a firm that had rated all 11 measures
as presenting “no obstacle” to the operation of its business.
[Tables 5 & 6 here]
Table 7 shows the ranking of countries according to the measures of the
softness of budget constraints and the quality of the business environment constructed
from the survey data. Countries are ranked from “best” to “worst” on each measure so
that those with the hardest budget constraints and the highest quality business
environments are ranked first. Countries from Central and Eastern Europe including
the Baltics (CEB) have three of the five hardest budget constraints: Lithuania,
Hungary and Estonia. The southern CIS and South-Eastern Europe (SEE) countries
appear to have the softest budget constraints – although it is noteworthy that two CEB
countries (Slovenia and the Czech Republic) are ranked 19th and 20th out of 25
countries. Russia is ranked with a harder budget constraint above these two countries
at 15th.
Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary have the highest scores for the quality of the
business environment. Russia is ranked 19th out of 25 and Albania, Kyrghistan and
Moldova are ranked worst. Uzbekistan emerges as the best performer from Central
Asia both on the budget hardness indicator (6th) and on the business environment
indicator (7th). The mean regional scores for each measure are shown in Table 8.
[Table 7 here]
Table 8 also reports variations in the soft budget constraint and business
environment measures for different ownership and size categories. Budget constraints
were softer for old than for new firms. Softness increased with the size of the firm.
New and privatized firms appear to have had a more pessimistic assessment of the
business environment than do state-owned firms. Larger firms appear to have viewed
the business environment more favourably than did smaller ones.
[Table 8 here]
Table 9 reveals a striking difference between the competitive environment
reported by state and private firms. One-quarter of state firms reported that they faced
no competition in the domestic market for their main product. For privatized firms,
this was true of less than one in ten firms and for new firms, of one in 20. Private
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firms reported a much greater sensitivity of their sales to a 10% increase in their price
relative to their competitors than did state firms. Whereas just over one-quarter of
state firms believed that a 10% price rise would lead many customers to switch to
alternative suppliers, this was closer to 40% for private firms. The reported markup of
prices over operating costs was highest for new firms and lowest for state firms. This
may reflect the sharing of rents with workers in state firms that have monopoly
power. Table 7 also indicates that a smaller proportion of state firms as compared
with other firms reported pressure from domestic competitors as playing a significant
role in their decision to enter new markets or introduce new products. Amongst
private firms, one in five reported pressures from foreign competitors as significant in
stimulating the introduction of new products. New entrants reported less pressure
from foreign competition, which may reflect their small average size. As the lower
part of the table suggests, indicators of market power were generally related directly
to size. The exception is the mark-up, where smaller firms reported higher mark-ups.
[Table 9 here]
If we consider the average sales growth according to the number of
competitors a firm reports itself as facing, the result is very interesting. Firms facing
between one and three competitors had average sales growth of over 11%, while
monopolists had more or less zero growth and firms facing more than three
competitors had growth of only 2%. Whether this bivariate correlation stands up to
more rigorous econometric estimation will be investigated in section 3.
As we noted earlier, firms facing an intermediate level of competition may be
those that are innovating. The prospect of super-normal profits from the temporary
dominance of a market niche provides the incentive for the introduction of a new
product or the entry into a new market. The presence of some rents finances the
investment needed to implement the necessary restructuring. From this perspective, it
is useful to examine how firms financed their investment. Table 10 reports the
proportion of fixed investment over the previous year financed from a range of
sources and shows that retained earnings were of major importance for the firms in
our survey. Retained earnings accounted for 60% of all investment. They were more
important for privatized than for state firms and in turn more important for insider
than for outsider owned privatized firms. It is interesting to note that state finance for
investment was not a significant source for privatized firms but accounted for one-
fifth of finance for investment by state-owned firms. Privatization has allowed firms
significant access to equity finance only in Central and Eastern Europe, and even here
privatized firms raised only 11% of funds from new equity compared to 6% for state
firms. Local commercial banks provided a greater share of investment finance than
equity markets except in the Southern CIS and Central Asia (where the banking sector
is particularly weak), and even this was above 10% of fixed investment only in the
CEB countries.
[Table 10]
The potential significance of retained earnings is underlined by the fact that
when firms were asked the greatest obstacle to financing of their business, 46%
replied high interest rates on borrowing, a far greater proportion than for any other
obstacle. State firms reported lower levels of concern with financial constraints than
14
did private firms (Table 11). This presumably reflects the easier access of state firms
to state investment finance along with other factors such as size.
[Table 11]
3. Econometric estimation and modelling strategy
Our objective is to make use of this large cross-sectional data set to examine
the determinants of restructuring and performance. There are serious shortcomings
with the data that limit the analysis that can be undertaken. In particular, there is no
true time-series dimension. We have only self-reported information on the change in
real sales as well as on the kinds of restructuring activities carried out by the firms
over the preceding three years. This feature of the data limits the confidence we can
place in the analysis of ownership effects because we cannot implement a test for the
selection effects of privatization. To the extent that it was the “better” state-owned
firms that were privatized, the lack of a correction for selection effects would bias the
results toward finding a positive relationship between privatized firms (compared with
those still in state ownership) and both restructuring and performance. We need to
keep this problem in mind when analyzing the results.
However, other features of the data balance the lack of a true time series
dimension. First, the extent of country variation in the sample is very valuable. With
25 countries, it is possible to address the problem of the endogeneity of soft budget
constraints and the perceived business environment. We, like previous researchers,
have at our disposal firm-level indicators of budget softness or the business
environment. However, as argued in the previous section, in a study covering just one
or a few countries, these raw data are of limited use in an econometric testing
framework. It is difficult or impossible, for example, to disentangle the possible
impact on performance of an environment of soft budget constraints from the effect of
the firm’s performance on its own experience of budgetary softness. With 25
countries covered by our sample, we are able to address this issue by exploiting the
cross-country dimension to increase the number of instruments available for
instrumental variables estimation.
Second, as noted in the introduction, the measurement of competitive pressure
in the economy is very difficult. In many studies, only industry level proxies for
competition in the form of indicators of market structure are available (e.g.,
concentration ratios). The problem is that the “industry” may be quite distant from the
concept of the “market” that is relevant to a firm’s products. Moreover, concentration
measures may not accurately reflect the competitive threat in an industry, especially
in so-called endogenous sunk-cost industries. The firm-level measures of perceived
competition described in the previous section might provide a measure closer to the
economic concept in which we are interested.
It was argued earlier that transition countries provide a valuable opportunity
for attempting to measure the impact of competition on performance because
endogeneity is less of a problem than in established market economies. There, the
market structure may have been shaped by the successful performance of some firms,
leading to a positive correlation between the degree of monopoly and performance
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with the causality from performance to structure. In transition countries, it is more
plausible to think that the extent of competition in the market is exogenous to the
firm. We must recognize, however, that our firm-level measures of “perceived
competition” may indeed reflect actions taken by the firm to introduce new products
or enter new markets where it will face less competition. Innovation may be
motivated by the prospect of market power and successful innovation may be
rewarded by market power, albeit temporary. Hence, we cannot escape entirely from
the problems of the endogeneity of market structure.
Third, the data are very rich in their restructuring variables. This helps us to
narrow down the ways in which competition, soft budget constraints and the quality
of the business environment affect restructuring and performance. The survey reports
information about the constraints faced by firms, the actions taken by them in
response to those constraints, and the outcome of these actions in terms of
performance. It would be tempting, but misleading, to think that the causality runs
from a firm’s external constraints through the restructuring decisions it takes to the
performance outcome. Although this may often be true, sometimes the causality runs
the other way. It may be the firm’s poor performance that provokes its owners or
managers to take certain restructuring decisions. If these are good decisions they may
improve performance relative to what it would otherwise have been, even if they are
associated with a deterioration of performance relative to what it was in the past.
Likewise, it may be the firm’s good performance, or the observed willingness of its
managers to take difficult restructuring decisions that makes the firm an attractive
prospect for privatization. These difficulties in disentangling the direction of causality
have been even greater for many previous studies that have tried to link the firm’s
external constraints directly to performance; the presence of restructuring information
provides important clues about the likely ways in which the causality may operate.12
Our strategy is to estimate equations for performance, with the dependent
variable measured in two ways: first, by the real growth of sales over the preceding
three years, and second by the growth of real labour productivity over the same
period.13 We take performance to depend on five types of variable, some of which are
evidently endogenous: ownership, competition, the extent of restructuring activity, the
state of the business environment and the presence of soft budget constraints. The
common equation structure is:
17643210 ßßßßßßß ubesbcnewstatercompy ++++++++= 5Xß (1)
where y is the performance variable (growth of sales or labour productivity), comp
and r are variables for the extent of competition and restructuring, respectively, state
is a dummy variable for state-owned firms, new is a dummy variable for ab initio
private firms (those without a state-owned predecessor),  X is a set of controls (size of
                                                                
12 See Djankov (1999a,b), Earle and Estrin (1997), Bilsen and Konings (1997).
13 As a robustness test, we re-estimated our performance regressions using winsorized measures of
sales and productivity growth. Winsorizing truncates the distribution of a variable at some arbitrary
point – in our case, at the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles – but then rather than, say, discarding the outlier
observations, accumulates them at the truncation points.  We winsorized by country, and hence to
construct winsorized log sales and productivity growth, the 5% of firms with the highest and lowest
growth in a country have had their reported growth truncated in this way.  The results did not change
significantly.
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firm as measured by the log of employment, location as measured by a dummy for
whether the firm is located in a large city, and sector as measured by a dummy for the
service sector), sbc and be are variables for soft budget constraint and business
environment, respectively, and u is an error term.
As noted earlier, there may be a spurious correlation between performance as
measured over the preceding three years and size as measured at the time of survey,
because ceteris paribus firms that grew during the period will tend to be larger at the
end of the period.  We therefore use average employment during the period as our size
measure in the sales growth equation, calculated from observed end-period
employment 14 and employment growth during the period (both in logs).15  This
measure of size is problematic for the productivity equation because employment
growth is used in the construction of both the size and the productivity variables, and
measurement error in employment growth will generate a spurious positive
correlation between them. On these a priori grounds, and on the ex post grounds of
the absence of size effects in the sales growth equation (see below), we omit size from
the productivity equation.
The variables r, sbc and be are constructed using principal components from
responses to various relevant questions. In addition, we used the same methodology to
construct a variable d capturing “defensive” or cost-reducing restructuring.16  The soft
budget constraint and business environment indexes were described above.  For our
basic restructuring measure r we used responses to four questions on whether, in the
preceding three years, firms had developed a new product line or upgraded an existing
one, opened a new plant, or obtained ISO9000 accreditation.  Our “defensive
restructuring” measure d was constructed using responses to three questions on
whether firms had reduced employment by more than 10%, discontinued at least one
product line, or closed at least one plant.  Tables 12 and 13 summarize the principal
components results for these restructuring measures.  In the case of our restructuring
measure r, the first of the four components explains 44% of the total variation, more
than double that of the second component; introduction of a new product or upgrading
an existing one are given the largest weights in the construction of the index.  The
first principal component of the defensive restructuring measure d explains 55% of
the total variation, almost double that of the second component; the index gives the
largest weighting to labour shedding.  In both cases, the indexes are normalized so
that the minimum value is zero and the maximum value is the number of possible
restructuring measures.  This is done to facilitate interpretation of the regression
results – a unit increase in the index corresponds, roughly speaking, to the
introduction of another restructuring measure.
                                                                
14 Firms report employment by choosing 1 of 6 size categories; our end-period “log employment” is the
log of the midpoint of the reported category.
15 We note that when the sales growth equation is reestimated using end-period size, it is positive and
highly significant.  In the results reported below using average-period size, it is statistically
insignificant.
16 The use of these summary measures is more conservative than the alternative of including all the
individual components as explanatory variables in the various regressions.  With so many regressors, a
likely outcome of this alternative procedure is a finding that some regressors are significant and with
the expected sign, some are insignificant, and some are significant but with the opposite of the
expected sign, making it difficult to reach an overall interpretation of the results.
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The restructuring estimating equation is
27643210 ??????? ubesbcnewstatepressurecompr ++++++++= 5X? (2)
where pressure is the firm’s response to three questions on the influence of domestic
competition, foreign competition, and customers on developing new products and
entering new markets (in each case rated on a scale of 1=not important to 4=very
important), and the other variables are as defined above. The defensive restructuring
equation is the same except for the omission of pressure:
3653210 ubesbcnewstatecompd +δ+δ++δ+δ+δ+δ= 4Xd (3)
Although we report estimates using d as a dependent variable we did not use it as an
explanatory variable in our performance equations because of endogeneity problems.
Our measures of defensive restructuring (e.g., labour shedding) are likely to depend
on firm performance, and we lack adequate instruments to deal with this problem.
We are, however, able to address the endogeneity of sbc, be and r, by taking
advantage of the fact that our dataset has a panel-like structure.  We adopt a one-way
error component framework, in which the term uij in each estimating equation
corresponding to firm i in country j is assumed to have a country-specific effect µj and
an idiosyncratic component ?ij.  When µj is assumed to be a fixed parameter,
estimation is done using the method of instrumental variables (2-stage least squares)
applied to a fixed effects model.  When µj is treated as stochastic, we use the
instrumental variables analogue of the random effects model, Baltagi’s (1981) error-
components 2-stage least squares (EC2SLS) estimator.17 We report both fixed effects
2SLS and EC2SLS estimations.  Analogously to Hausman and Taylor’s (1981) and
Amemiya and MaCurdy’s (1986) estimators for endogenous random effects, we use
as instruments our measures of competition (market structure and 10% price test)
interacted with the 25 country dummies.  That is, where Cj is the country dummy
(column vector) for country j, Z is a measure of competition (also a column vector),
and * denotes entry-wise matrix multiplication (Hadamard or Schur product), we
have, for each of our competition measures, a 24-column instrument matrix
]C*ZC*[Z
~
252 L=Z . The first interaction term is dropped because of collinearity
with the uninteracted Z present in the equations (1)-(3). As Baltagi (1995, pp. 118-19)
puts it in his discussion of the Hausman-Taylor and Amemiya-MaCurdy estimators,
we are taking advantage of the panel-like nature of our dataset by using instruments
from within the model.  Each competition measure is used 25 times, once as an
exogenous variable in equations (1)-(3) and 24 times as an instrument.
Another way of describing our strategy is in terms of identification and
exclusion restrictions and the underlying structural model.  The parameters in our
performance and restructuring equations (1)-(3) are assumed to hold for all countries,
i.e., we are pooling across countries.  The soft budget constraint and business
environment faced by firms is, however, assumed to vary across countries – e.g., poor
                                                                
17 The intuition behind the EC2SLS estimator is that, where the standard random effects estimator is a
weighted average of the between and within estimators, the EC2SLS estimator is a weighted average of
2SLS estimation of a between estimator and 2SLS estimation of a within estimator.  See Baltagi
(1995), chapter 7.
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performance by a firm in one country may be less likely to generate tax and utility
arrears than if it operated in another country. It may also be the case that the way in
which features of the business environment affect firm performance differ across
countries. Using competition measures (which enter directly into equation (1) and
which through equation (2) indirectly affect performance via restructuring) interacted
with country dummies as instruments is, in effect, modelling this differential
behaviour across countries. By pooling across countries in our performance and
restructuring equations but allowing the soft budget constraint and business
environment parameters to vary across countries, we are in effect treating
entrepreneurs as similar across countries but governments as different. The validity of
the interaction effects as instruments can be tested using a test of overidentifying
restrictions, and we do so.
The full set of instruments available are thus the country-competition
interaction effects and the pressure variables that appear as determinants of
restructuring in equation (2). Equation (1) is identified through the exclusion of the
country-competition interaction effects and the pressure variables; equation (2) is
identified by the exclusion of the interaction effects and the performance variables.
However, because our prior is that defensive restructuring is spurred by poor
performance but we do not have the instruments available to estimate equation (3)
with y as an explanatory variable, the defensive restructuring structural equation is
unidentified. Estimation of the defensive restructuring equation without performance
as an explanatory variable means equation (3) is in effect partially a reduced form
equation, and the estimated coefficients need to be interpreted in this light.18
Similarly, the a priori exclusion of y as an explanatory variable in the restructuring
equation (2) means it is identified, but this exclusion may be questioned.  An
additional issue involving equation (2) concerns the pressure variables: one may
question whether a response to a question on whether the firm “faces pressure” is
exogenous.19  We will also see that the results for equation (2) itself suggest caution in
the treatment of r in equation (1). A separate problem is that ideally restructuring
activity should be measured prior to the period in which performance is measured, but
all we have is restructuring and performance measured contemporaneously.  Because
of these concerns, we therefore estimate equation (1) in two forms, with and without r
as an explanatory variable.  When r is included as an explanatory variable, the
instrument set consists of the country-competition interaction terms and the pressure
variables; when r is excluded from the estimation of equation (1), only the country-
competition interaction terms are used as instruments.
Our estimations are presented along with several diagnostic tests.  The
benchmark estimation is 2SLS fixed effects. For this estimation we report the
Davidson-MacKinnon (1993) test of overidentifying restrictions, a test of the joint
hypothesis that the instruments are valid (i.e., uncorrelated with ?ij) and that none of
the instruments should have been included in the set of regressors and were not.  We
report the results of a standard fixed effects ordinary least squares (OLS) regression,
accompanied by a specification test of OLS versus 2SLS, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman
                                                                
18 That is, the reported coefficients include both direct and indirect impacts, the latter operating via firm
performance.
19 Some evidence that this is a legitimate concern come from 2SLS estimation of equation (1), omitting
sbc and be, and instrumenting r with the pressure variables only.  This equation fails the Davidson-
MacKinnon test of overidentifying restrictions at a p-value of 1%.
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(DWH) χ2 test with degrees of freedom equal to the number of endogenous variables.
Failure of this test indicates inconsistency of OLS.
A DWH specification test is also used to test the EC2SLS results versus 2SLS,
i.e., a test of fixed vs. random effects. A DWH χ2 test statistic may sometimes be
negative, a finite-sample problem that is outside the model structure; a suggested
interpretation is to treat the result as zero and not reject the null (Greene 2000,
p. 386). Lastly, both the 2SLS and EC2SLS results are accompanied by an F-test of
the significance of the instruments in the first-stage regressions (Bound et al., 1997).
High values of the F-statistic would indicate that our instruments are well correlated
with the endogenous variables that appear on the right hand side. We shall see that the
correlations are weaker in the 2SLS fixed effects specifications, which can explain
why sbc and be have low levels of significance in the second-stage regression.  The
stronger first-stage correlations in the random effects specification are driven by the
fact that the instrument set used in the EC2SLS estimator in effect includes, in
addition to the country-interacted competition variables, the country dummies
themselves,20 and there is considerable cross-country variation in both sbc and be.
4. Results
Performance
Tables 14 and 15 report results for performance measured by the growth of
sales and of productivity, respectively. When interpreting the results, it is important to
recall that the average growth of sales and of productivity of firms was close to zero
and only just over 40% of firms reported positive sales growth over the preceding
three years. The findings are striking.
[Tables 14 and 15 here]
The nature of competition in the product market has important effects on the
performance of firms. There are strong indications of a non-monotonic relationship
with performance. Sales and productivity growth were higher in firms facing between
one and three competitors in the market for their main product than in firms that either
faced no competition at all or that faced more than three competitors. The positive
effect of an intermediate degree of product market competition is economically as
well as statistically significant. Firms facing between one and three competitors
reported growth between 10% and 13% higher than other firms. Firms reporting more
than three competitors have higher sales growth than monopolists, though not
significantly so.
The second indication that competition effects are important comes from the
positive sign on the variable for firms reporting that sales would fall only slightly or
not at all in response to a 10% price rise: these firms saw sales growth between 10%
and 15% higher than others. In relation to productivity growth, we find a clear
inverse-U shaped pattern with firms reporting that sales would fall slightly in response
to a 10% price rise having significantly higher productivity growth (between 6% and
                                                                
20 These are unavailable as instruments in the fixed effects 2SLS estimator because they appear as
explanatory variables.
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8%) than either firms reporting a high sensitivity of demand or those reporting
complete insensitivity of demand.
New product restructuring is an important determinant of sales growth and as
we shall see below, the pressure from foreign competitors and from customers to
introduce new products are both significant determinants of restructuring. This
highlights a third channel through which competition effects are playing a role in the
performance regressions.
Controlling for other factors, there is no significant relationship between
privatization and performance. That is, state-owned firms show no significant
difference in their sales or productivity growth performance as compared with
privatized firms that were formerly state-owned. New private firms have significantly
higher sales growth and lower productivity growth. It is, of course, impossible to tell
how much of the positive relationship between new entry and sales growth is due to
“survivor bias”, namely the fact that the only new firms observed are the successful
ones. The weaker productivity growth of new entrants is likely to indicate that such
firms have been attracting labour faster than their sales have been growing.
Unfortunately, the data is not available to examine the relative productivity level of
new entrants as compared with incumbent firms.
The prevalence of soft budget constraints has a negative impact on the sales
growth of firms, but this is significant only in the OLS fixed effects estimation. The
business environment has a positive impact, though this is significant only in the OLS
fixed effects (at the 5% level) and in the random effects EC2SLS specification (at the
5% level in the productivity equations, and nearly so in the sales equations). There is
no systematic relationship between sector or urbanization and performance. As
explained earlier, size of firm is included only in the sales regression and is
insignificant.
The diagnostic tests reported in Tables 14 and 15 are broadly reassuring about
the validity of the estimation procedures implemented.21 The F-test of fixed effects
confirms the joint significance of country effects. The more conservative procedure is
to estimate via fixed rather than random effects and we begin by comparing fixed
effects estimation using the OLS estimator with the 2SLS estimator. Our concern to
deal with the endogeneity of the soft budget constraint, business environment and
restructuring variables motivated the 2SLS estimation. As noted in section 3, two
issues arise. The first question is whether the instruments are correlated with the
endogenous variables. The F-tests of the significance of the instruments in the first
stage regressions suggest that there might be cause for concern about the instruments,
particularly in the case of the business environment variable. The second concern is to
ascertain whether the instruments are valid in the sense that they are uncorrelated with
the idiosyncratic error and that none of the instruments should have been included in
the set of regressors. This test of overidentification is passed by a considerable
                                                                
21 An additional test not reported in the tables was to see whether the results are sensitive to how r, sbc
and be are constructed using principal components.  We reestimated the performance equations using,
in place of these constructed variables, the single variable given the greatest weight by the principal
components procedure, namely whether or not the firm had upgraded a product line, whether it had a
problem with tax arrears to central government, and whether organized crime was a problem.  The
results of the estimations were similar to those reported in the tables.
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margin. The DWH tests of the OLS versus the instrumental variables (i.e., 2SLS)
specifications suggest there is no significant difference between the two – but this
may simply reflect the relative weakness of the instruments.
Since a random effects estimation is more efficient, we tested whether it was
possible to accept a random effects (EC2SLS) versus a fixed effects (2SLS) model.
The test passed by a large margin in one of the four cases, failed by a large margin in
a second case, and generated negative χ2 statistics in the other two cases. Although as
noted in section 3 the negative χ2 statistics can be interpreted as allowing us to accept
the hypothesis that the EC2SLS estimation is consistent, the results for this DWH test
generally appear to be sensitive to the regression specification and should be
interpreted with caution. The F-tests of the instruments in the first-stage regressions
are passed much more convincingly in the random effects model. This is true of both
the soft budget constraint and the business environment variables and is not surprising
since we hypothesized an important country effect in each case; it also helps explain
why the latter is significant in the random effects specifications but not in the fixed
effects specifications.
We can summarize the implications of the testing procedure for performance
as follows. The competition effects in the sales growth and productivity equations are
very robust. Our a priori hypothesis about the likely endogeneity of the soft budget
constraint and business environment variables in the sales growth equation is also
confirmed – in both cases the effects become less significant once a 2SLS procedure
is implemented.
Restructuring
Table 16 reports the results of the equation for new product restructuring. As
reported in Table 3, nearly 30% of firms reported that they had introduced a major
new product line. The regression results confirm that larger firms are much more
likely and those in the service sector much less likely to have engaged in new product
restructuring.
[Table 16 here]
In addition, the following features emerge from the results. State-owned firms
are less likely to engage in new product restructuring.22 There is no systematic
difference between privatized and new firms in this respect.
Although the number of competitors is not a significant determinant of the
decision to innovate, we can nevertheless observe important competition effects.
Market power as measured by the 10% test is an important positive determinant of
new product development, but so is pressure from both foreign competitors and from
customers (though pressure from domestic competitors is insignificant).23 Domestic
                                                                
22 We cannot exclude the possibility that firms with more potential to restructure in this way were more
likely to have been privatized.
23 For new entrants in particular, there is a possible endogeneity associated with market power as
measured by the 10% test. Compared with an average reported mark-up of 17 percentage points, a
previous decision to develop a new product or market was associated for new entrants with an
increased mark-up of 2.7 percentage points, and a decision to upgrade an existing product with an
22
and foreign competition appear to be only imperfect substitutes. Soft budget
constraints are a significant disincentive to new product restructuring in most
specifications. The quality of the business environment is not significantly related to
innovation.
The diagnostic tests suggest that the restructuring equation be interpreted with
caution. In particular, even the conservative fixed effects 2SLS estimation is not
completely satisfactory. There is evidence that the instruments are relatively weak in
the first stage regressions, and the failure of the Davidson-MacKinnon test indicates
either that they are invalid or that they should have been included as regressors in the
equation. 24 Whilst we can accept the random versus fixed effects specification, we
would still counsel caution. It is for this reason that we presented the performance
regressions both with and without the restructuring variable.
Finally, table 17 reports the results for defensive restructuring. These are very
interesting, because the impact of ownership and competition are the opposite of those
for new product restructuring. State-owned firms are very significantly more likely to
have engaged in defensive restructuring. We cannot exclude the possibility that this
may reflect the fact that privatized firms undertook defensive restructuring earlier in
the reform process – i.e., before the sample period. Although the number of
competitors is insignificant, firms with market power as measured by the 10% test are
significantly less likely to have engaged in defensive restructuring. The effects of size
and service sector presence are similar to those for new product restructuring.
[Table 17 here]
Controlling for these other factors, soft budget constraints are associated in
most specifications with more defensive restructuring. This suggests we may be
having some difficulty identifying precisely how soft budget constraints work: they
may be a way in which poorly-performing firms continue to survive, but defensive
restructuring may be part of the price the state extracts for its continued support. The
business environment variable is negative in the OLS estimation – i.e., a better
business environment is associated with less defensive restructuring but is positive in
the 2SLS estimation (fixed effects). This may suggest that firms doing more defensive
restructuring are particularly critical of the business environment they face, but when
endogeneity is accounted for, a better business environment promotes more defensive
restructuring. However, the diagnostic statistics suggest that the defensive
restructuring equation is problematic. The Davidson-McKinnon test is failed and,
moreover, it is not possible to accept the random versus the fixed effects specification.
We can summarize our findings for the determinants of restructuring. We have
less confidence that problems of endogeneity have been dealt with satisfactorily in the
restructuring equations as compared with the performance equations. This makes us
                                                                                                                                                                                         
increased mark-up of 2.1 percentage points (the former statistically significant at 5% and the latter at
10%).
24 The fact that the same instrument set passed the Davidson-MacKinnon test in the sales and
productivity growth equations suggests that the problem here is the omission of these variables from
the restructuring equation rather than their lack of validity as instruments.  This in turn can be
interpreted as suggesting that the impact of competition on restructuring varies by country, either
directly or indirectly because we have excluded performance as an explanatory variable.  We do not,
however, explore this further here.
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less sure about the way in which soft budget constraints and the business environment
affect restructuring. Nevertheless, the competition and ownership effects seem to be
robust to the estimation method. New product restructuring increases with market
power and firms subjected to pressure from foreign competitors and suppliers do more
new product restructuring. By contrast, firms that do not face much competition do
less defensive restructuring. State-owned firms do less new product but more
defensive restructuring. However, this could be a cohort effect rather than an
ownership effect.
5. Concluding remarks
An important finding of this study is the power of competition in influencing
performance.25 It appears much more important than the effect of ownership per se.
We did not expect to find it so clearly, and we did not expect to find evidence of a
non-monotonic effect. In the growth of sales and productivity, as well as in new
product restructuring, the presence of some market power together with competitive
pressure, especially from foreign suppliers, strongly and robustly enhances
performance. New product restructuring is in turn an important contributor to firm
performance, so this non-monotonic character of competition (“some market power
but not too much”) appears to have both direct and indirect effects. These findings are
consistent with the presence of a Schumpeterian-type competitive process at work in
the transition economies, albeit one accompanied by considerable disruption and
turbulence (see Carlin, Haskel and Seabright, 2001). Consistent with the findings of
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), this evidence suggests that it is the presence of two or
three seriously competing firms that generates competitive conduct. Moreover,
transition is an investment-intensive process and the descriptive evidence from the
survey indicates the presence of financing constraints. This supports the interpretation
that retained profits – in the presence of competitive pressure – are important for
financing the restructuring that helps firms to succeed.
The presence of soft budget constraints appears to have a broadly negative
impact, and a favourable business environment a broadly positive impact, on firm
performance. These effects are not so econometrically robust as the competition
effect, though this is unsurprising since they are country-level effects and significantly
endogenous.
Turning to policy implications, our findings strongly reinforce the message
that unchallenged monopoly is a drain on performance. It is certainly more important
to ensure that monopolists face at least some challenge than to try refereeing the
necessarily confused process of rivalry among the few. It is true that at the same time
as the importance of competition is becoming more apparent, so are the difficulties in
the way of bringing about such a process effectively (see Fingleton et.al., 1996). But
our results help to illuminate the many ingredients needed for the competitive process
to work. Not only must there be a market structure in which firms face rivalry rather
than secure monopoly but also: an end to soft budget constraints, removal of the
obstacles facing new entrants, and financial systems that can support major
investments in restructuring.
                                                                
25 Strictly speaking this is perceived competition, and interesting questions arise about the robustness of
the link between perceived competition and the objective character of the market environment,
questions we cannot pretend to have given adequate consideration here.
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Consider an economy with two sectors, A and B. Let PA be labour productivity in sector A, and P be
































Denote the change in productivity between period t-1 and period t as ∆(P) ≡ P t - P t-1.







where the first two terms constitute the within-sector component and the last two constitute the
between-sector component.
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Table 1. Number of firms by size, sector and region.











All firms 1129 (34.2) 377 (11.4) 1049 (31.7) 750 (22.7) 3305 (100)
Micro 176 71 504 221 972 (29.4)
Small 210 94 292 168 764 (23.1)
Medium 374 144 186 214 918 (27.8)
Full sample
Large 369 68 67 147 651 (19.7)
CEB 317 (28.5) 90 (8.1) 361 (32.6) 340 (30.7) 1108 (100)
SEE 334 (44.6) 69 (9.2) 209 (27.9) 137 (18.3) 749 (100)
Russia 131 (32.3) 65 (16.0) 155 (38.1) 55 (13.6) 406 (100)
Western CIS 116 (37.3) 47 (15.1) 104 (33.4) 44 (14.2) 311 (100)
Southern CIS 125 (28.6) 55 (12.6) 164 (37.5) 93 (21.3) 437 (100)
Central Asia 106 (36.1) 51 (17.4) 56 (19.1) 81 (27.6) 294 (100)
Note. Micro firms (employment < 10); small firms (employment 10-49); medium firms (50-199), large
(>200). “Other industry” comprises mining, construction and electricity; “other services” comprises
transport, financial, personal, business and miscellaneous services. The allocation of countries to
regions is shown in Table 5.
Table 2. Real sales and productivity growth by ownership of firm
Full sample (non-agricultural businesses ), mean log 3-year sales and productivity growth
Old firms
SOE Privatized
New firms All firms
Number of firms









Sales growth -0.010 -0.020 0.062 0.026
Increase in sales 39.7 44.8 48.9 46.2
Zero growth 30.0 20.1 24.1 23.9




firm type (%) 100 100 100 100
Productivity growth 0.089 0.082 -0.030 0.022
Note: The question asked was, “By what percentage have your sales changed in real terms over the last
three years?”. “Productivity” growth is calculated from the change in sales and in employment reported
over the last three years.
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Table 3.  Enterprise Restructuring Activities by Ownership Type
and Size of Firm
(In proportion of firm type, %)
Old firms
SOE Privatized
New firms All firms
Employment decreases 47.4 44.2 17.9 30.4
Closure of plant 11.2 10.9 5.6 8.0
Employment increase 15.1 22.3 37.7 29.6
Opening of new plant 15.7 22.7 19.1 19.6
New product line 27.4 33.6 28.4 29.8
Upgrade 42.3 43.1 37.6 40.0
Change supplier 16.6 21.1 21.3 20.5
Change customer 17.6 27.3 24.1 24.0
Change main bank 15.3 18.3 14.3 15.6
Change organizational structure 7.6 12.6 8.4 9.5
Micro Small Medium Large
Employment decreases 17.3 24.9 38.0 45.8
Closure of plant 3.7 5.9 10.7 13.2
Employment increase 27.8 39.7 27.3 23.5
Opening of new plant 11.2 18.5 23.7 27.8
New product line 22.1 28.9 31.4 39.9
Upgrade 31.1 38.5 42.7 51.2
Change supplier 21.4 20.0 20.8 19.4
Change customer 24.7 24.3 22.5 24.4
Change main bank 8.4 18.2 18.6 19.2
Change organizational structure 5.5 11.2 10.9 11.3
Notes: All restructuring indicators refer to changes in the previous three years. Employment
decrease/increase refers to a decrease/increase of employment of more than 10%. “New product line”
refers to the successful development of a major new product line. “Upgrade” refers to the upgrading of
an existing product line. “Change supplier”; “Change customer” is change of identity of main supplier/
main customers (>20% of sales). “Change organizational structure” means firm has had a completely
new organizational structure. Size of firms as defined in Table 1.
Table 4. Managerial Turnover by Ownership Type







New firms All firms
Changed general
manager in past 3
years
37.6 21.0 30.3 10.9 20.2
Of which, new
general manager
from outside the firm
13.8 7.3 13.8 3.0 7.4
Note: Insider owned firms are defined as those that are neither state-owned nor new private firms and
answered “Its managers” or “Its workers” to the question, “Which of the following best describes the
type of owner which now has the largest stake in your firm?”  Outsider owned firms are defined by
those privatized firms that are not insider owned.
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Table 5. Construction of soft budget constraint measure
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Proportion
1 1.999 0.815 0.815
2 0.338 1.662 0.138 0.953
3 0.116 0.221 0.048 1.000





to central government? 0.640
to local government? 0.575
to utilities? 0.510
Table 6. Construction of business environment measure
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Proportion
1 4.357 0.341 0.341
2 1.660 2.696 0.130 0.472
3 1.398 0.263 0.109 0.580
4 1.058 0.340 0.083 0.662
5 0.892 0.166 0.070 0.732
6 0.811 0.081 0.063 0.795
7 0.749 0.062 0.059 0.854
8 0.629 0.120 0.049 0.903
9 0.476 0.153 0.037 0.940
10 0.399 0.077 0.031 0.972
11 0.365 0.034 0.029 1.000
Survey question: How problematic are these factors for the












Infrastructure (e.g. telephone, electricity, water, roads, land) 0.177
High rate of taxation 0.175
Business licensing 0.172
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Table 7. Country rankings for soft budget constraint and business environment
variables
Soft budget constraint (“hardest” first) Rank Business environment (“best” first) Rank
Estonia CEB 1 Estonia CEB 1
FYR Macedonia SEE 2 Slovenia CEB 2
Belarus W-CIS 3 Hungary CEB 3
Hungary CEB 3 Armenia S-CIS 4
Lithuania CEB 5 Rep. Srpska SEE 5
Bulgaria SEE 6 Poland CEB 6
Uzbekistan C-ASIA 6 Uzbekistan C-ASIA 7
Kazakhstan C-ASIA 8 Slovakia CEB 8
Poland CEB 9 Latvia CEB 9
Latvia CEB 10 Czech Republic CEB 10
Albania SEE 11 Azerbaijan S-CIS 11
Kyrghistan C-ASIA 11 FYR Macedonia SEE 11
Bosnia SEE 13 Bosnia SEE 13
Romania SEE 13 Croatia SEE 13
Moldova S-CIS 15 Bulgaria SEE 15
Russia RUSSIA 15 Belarus W-CIS 16
Slovakia CEB 15 Lithuania CEB 16
Ukraine W-CIS 15 Kazakhstan C-ASIA 18
Slovenia CEB 19 Romania SEE 18
Czech Republic CEB 20 Russia RUSSIA 18
Armenia S-CIS 21 Ukraine W-CIS 18
Rep. Srpska
(Bosnia-Herzegovina)
SEE 22 Georgia S-CIS 22
Croatia SEE 23 Albania SEE 23
Azerbaijan S-CIS 24 Kyrghistan C-ASIA 24
Georgia S-CIS 25 Moldova S-CIS 25
Note: For explanation of the construction of the soft budget constraint and business environment
variables on which these rankings are based, see text.
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Table 8.  Soft budget constraint and business environment variables by
ownership, size and region.
Soft budget constraint, higher score is “softer”. Business environment, higher score is “better”.
Both measures lie in the range [0, 1].
Soft budget constraint Business environment













































Table 9.  Competition in the Product Market
Old firms
SOE Privatized
New firms All firms
Panel A. Strength of competition (in proportion of firm type, %)
Zero competitors 25.6 8.8 5.2 9.5
One to three competitors 18.9 13.2 11.9 13.4
More than three 55.0 77.9 82.9 77.1
Panel B. 10% price test (in proportion of firm type, %)
Many customers would switch
to other suppliers
25.9 36.3 39.3 36.3
Customers would stay but sales
would fall a lot
23.3 26.9 24.8 25.2
Customers would stay but sales
would fall slightly
26.3 25.7 24.9 25.3
No change in sales 24.5 11.1 11.0 13.2
Panel C. Mark up of price over operating costs (%, median for each type of firm)
Markup 10 10 15 12
Panel D. Pressure from domestic and foreign competitors in decisions to develop
new products and markets (in proportion of firm type, %)
Domestic competition 18.4 22.5 27.5 24.6
Foreign competition 17.5 21.1 15.4 17.4
Micro Small Medium Large
Panel A. Strength of competition (in proportion of firm type, %)
Zero competitors 4.8 7.2 12.4 15.1
One to three competitors 8.9 10.9 16.1 19.4
More than three 86.3 81.9 71.5 65.5
Panel B. 10% price test (in proportion of firm type, %)
Many customers would switch
to other suppliers
43.9 38.1 30.3 31.1
Customers would stay but sales
would fall a lot
25.1 24.6 25.8 25.3
Customers would stay but sales
would fall slightly
21.1 24.4 28.9 27.8
No change in sales 9.9 12.9 15.0 15.7
Panel C. Mark up of price over operating costs (%, median for each type of firm)
Markup 15 15 10 10
Panel D. Pressure from domestic and foreign competitors in decisions to develop
new products and markets (in proportion of firm type, %)
Domestic competition 31.6 23.6 22.0 18.9
Foreign competition 15.4 14.1 16.9 24.6
Note. The question asked in Panel A was “Thinking of your firm’s major product line in the domestic market, how
many competitors do you face?”; in Panel B: “If you were to raise prices of your main product line 10% above
their current level (after allowing for any inflation and assuming that your competitors maintained their current
prices), which of the following would best describe the result?”; in Panel C: “Considering your main product line,
by what margin does your sales price exceed your operating costs (i.e. the cost of material inputs plus wage
costs)?”; in Panel D, the proportion of each type of firm reporting that pressure from domestic or foreign
competitors is “very important” is shown. Size of firms as defined in Table 1.
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Table 10. Sources of Finance for Investment







New firms All firms
Internal funds
(retained earnings)
51.6 67.8 58.7 62.1 60.2
The state 22.6 3.2 1.4 0.5 4.4
Bank loans 6.8 9.7 9.9 6.8 7.7
Sale of new equity 3.2 5.3 5.9 6.8 5.9
Family 0.4 0.3 3.4 10.9 6.8
Note: The question asked was, “What proportion of your firm’s fixed investment has been financed
from each of the above sources over the past year?” The residual “other” category is not reported.
Table 11. Financial Constraints
Mean score by type of firm. Scale is 4 for “major obstacle” to 1 for “no obstacle” (ranked by







New firms All firms
High interest rates 3.14 3.39 3.31 3.26 3.26
Access to long-term bank
loans
2.67 2.90 2.67 2.80 2.76
Paperwork/bureaucracy 2.31 2.39 2.40 2.52 2.45
Collateral 2.33 2.40 2.36 2.45 2.41
Poor credit information on
customers
2.18 2.25 2.23 2.26 2.24
Access to lease finance 2.21 2.44 2.12 2.20 2.20
Access to
equity/investors/partners
2.17 2.24 2.12 2.17 2.16
Banks lack money to lend 2.21 2.22 2.12 2.20 2.18
Access to connections with
banks/financial institutions
1.97 2.04 2.04 2.26 2.15
Access to export credit 2.19 2.29 2.17 2.06 2.13
Access to foreign banks 2.07 2.01 2.02 2.19 2.12
Corruption of bank
officials
1.62 1.67 1.63 1.91 1.79
Note: the question asked was “How problematic are these different financing issues for the operation
and growth of your business?”
36
Table 12. Construction of new products restructuring measure r
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Proportion
1 0.336 0.439 0.439
2 0.167 0.169 0.218 0.657
3 0.145 0.022 0.189 0.846
4 0.118 0.027 0.154 1.000
Survey question: Has your company undertaken any of the




Upgrading of existing product line 0.693
Successful development of major new product line 0.622
Opening of new plant 0.298
Quality accreditation (ISO 9000) 0.212
Table 13. Construction of defensive restructuring measure d
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Proportion
1 0.235 0.551 0.551
2 0.126 0.109 0.296 0.846
3 0.066 0.061 0.154 1.000
Survey question: Has your company undertaken any of the




A reduction in the company workforce of greater than 10% 0.901
Discontinuation of at least one product line 0.368
closure of at least one existing plant 0.231
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Table 14. Performance regressions: sales growth
Dependent variable: real sales growth over the past 3 years No. obs=2245












* = significant at 5% level













    1-3 competitors





















Market power (10% test),
omitted is “many customers
would change suppliers”
    Sales would fall a lot
    Sales would fall slightly
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R-square (overall) 0.105 0.104 0.067 0.105 0.065















F-test of significance of IVs
in 1st stage regressions
    Soft budget constraint
    Business environment
    New product restructuring
n.a. F(122,2087)

























Table 15. Performance regressions: productivity growth
Dependent variable: constructed from real 3-year sales and employment growth No. obs=2245












* = significant at 5% level













    1-3 competitors





















Market power (10% test),
omitted is “many customers
would change suppliers”
    Sales would fall a lot
    Sales would fall slightly
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R-square (overall) 0.049 0.042 0.034 0.043 0.032















F-test of significance of IVs
in 1st stage regressions
    Soft budget constraint
    Business environment
    New product restructuring
n.a. F(123,2088)

























Table 16.  Determinants of new product restructuring
Dependent variable: constructed by principle components as discussed in the text No. obs=2245






* = significant at 5% level







Number of competitors, omitted is “zero”
    1-3 competitors













Market power (10% test), omitted is “many customers
would change suppliers”
    Sales would fall a lot
    Sales would fall slightly



















Firm faces important pressure to develop new
products and markets from domestic competitors,
omitted is “not at all important”
    Slightly important
    Fairly important



















Firm faces important pressure … from foreign
competitors, omitted is “not at all important”
    Slightly important
    Fairly important



















Firm faces important pressure … from customers,
omitted is “not at all important”
    Slightly important
    Fairly important



















Ownership, omitted is “privatized”
    State ownership

































































R-square (overall) 0.120 0.111 0.100










F-test of significance of IVs in 1st stage regressions
    Soft budget constraint
    Business environment
n.a. F(120,2081)




= stat  (p)
=1.43 (0.001)
=3.29 (0.000)






Table 17.  Determinants of defensive restructuring
Dependent variable: constructed by principle components as discussed in the text No. obs=2245






* = significant at 5% level







Number of competitors, omitted is “zero”
    1-3 competitors













Market power (10% test), omitted is “many customers
would change suppliers”
    Sales would fall a lot
    Sales would fall slightly



















Ownership, omitted is “privatized”
    State ownership


























































R-square (overall) 0.163 0.156 0.152











F-test of significance of IVs in 1st stage regressions
    Soft budget constraint
    Business environment
n.a. F(120,2090)




= stat  (p)
=1.58 (0.000)
=3.47 (0.000)











Log sales growth (3 years) 0.0463 0.505 -2.30 2.30
Log productivity growth (3 years) 0.0339 0.444 -2.56 2.30
New product restructuring index 1.30 1.27 0 4
Defensive restructuring index 0.445 0.606 0 3
Soft budget constraint index 0.177 0.273 0 1
Business environment index 0.476 0.221 0 1
Log employment (average period) 3.75 1.72 0.714 7.42
Table A2. Summary statistics of categorical variables used in regressions




















































Pressure from customers Not impt.
16.4
Slightly
23.1
Fairly
36.3
Very impt.
24.2
